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INTRODUCTION
Over the last 35 years since the first appearance of federal health, safety and environ-
mental laws in the US, public health and the environment continue to be adversely
affected by development,1 and limits to industrial growth are now clearly visible in the
examples of global climate disruption, changes in the reproductive health of all species,
and shortages of petroleum, freshwater and natural resources. Furthermore, the kinds of
risks of concern, and the nature of scientific uncertainty, are changing. These develop-
ments have sparked new interest in the concepts of precaution and prevention in many
environmental and public policy arenas.
Advances in the understanding of the causes of disease and new damage mechanisms
include endocrine disruption2 and other low-dose effects of chemical exposures;3
substances, such as nanoparticles, that can cross the blood–brain barrier; antibiotic,
drug and pesticide resistance; climate disruption; and interactions between toxic chemi-
cals, nutritional factors, infectious agents and genetics. Advances in scientific risk assess-
ment include green chemistry, green engineering, predictive toxicology, structure
activity relationships and rapid in vitro screens.4 Advances in technological approaches
include sustainable technology, products and system design. 
With advances in science and technology have come changes in the kinds of uncer-
tainty facing government agencies mandated to protect health, safety and the environ-
ment. These include classical uncertainty (expressed as probability distributions of
dose–response relationships and obscured by the lack of sufficiently definitive informa-
tion, contradictory evidence, or a deficiency in the knowledge of causal mechanisms and
pathways), indeterminacy (where we know what we don’t know), and ignorance (where
we don’t know what we don’t know).5 The general nature of uncertainty has shifted from
classical uncertainty (which itself is now understood to be more complex than originally
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envisioned and is difficult to apply in many areas of concern), towards indeterminacy (as
in the case of the extent of global warming) and ignorance (e.g. of possible risks to
ecosystems from deliberately released genetically modified (GM) crops).
Partly because of changing science and partly because of inadequate governmental
response, the trust in both government regulators and industry has declined, with a
corresponding increased demand for the participation of the public, consumers, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and citizens in decision-making related to protec-
tion of health, safety and the environment. This increased demand for participation has
resulted in a more critical look at the bases for governmental decisions.
Government has approached the problems of risky technologies and products by
constructing a two-step exercise: risk assessment followed by risk management.6 Value
judgments pervade both steps,7 and the precautionary principle could be applied in
choosing the data and models to inform risk assessment and also in deciding whether, to
what extent and how to provide protection.8
This chapter argues that in the US, the governmental responses to these changes are
wrong-headed and hide behind misguided formulaic methodologies of cost-benefit
analyses and quantitative risk assessments ostensibly offered to provide more sensible
and rational solutions9 to guide approaches to health, safety and environmental prob-
lems, but in actuality motivated by desires to accommodate industrial and producer
interests. Reflecting an increasingly anti-regulatory posture on the part of the federal
government, the undemocratic use of these methodologies has seriously undermined
health, safety and environmental protection in the US and (hopefully temporarily)
rendered a precautionary approach to solving health and environmental problems to a
historical relic. In the US, the undermining of protection is effectuated through:
• requiring regulations to be based on an increased level of scientific evidence or
justification;
• allowing regulations to be delayed because of scientific uncertainty;
• allowing a de minimis risk to remain unprotected or requiring a ‘significant risk’ to be
present before acting;10 and
• requiring that the benefits of regulating exceed, or justify, the imposition of costs.11
These factors, of course, directly impact upon whether and to what extent the precau-
tionary principle can be applied in the US.
The remainder of this chapter provides a brief history of the precautionary principle as
developed in the US with comparisons to its evolution in Europe; a regulatory decision-
making framework that agencies might follow, whether or not a precautionary approach is
embraced; a brief account of the politics of the regulation of chemicals in the US; a capsule
history of US chemical regulation and the use of the precautionary principle in US law;
and suggestions for reclaiming health, safety and environmental protection through the
creative use of the precautionary principle within the context of trade-off analysis: an alter-
native to cost-benefit analysis as a decision-making rationale that incorporates concerns for
distributional effects (equity), accounts for technological change through the use of
Technology Options Analysis, and otherwise avoids the biases of traditional cost-benefit
analysis.12 Contrary to the commonplace practice of both advocates and critics of the
precautionary principle in placing risk assessment and the precautionary principle in
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354 THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND CHEMICALS
conflict, this chapter argues that risk assessment has a sensible place in implementing the
precautionary principle and that it is cost-benefit analysis, and the use of risk assessment
there, that conflicts with the principle.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
The precautionary principle has two distinct formulations:13
1 Where there are possibilities of large or irreversible serious effects, scientific uncer-
tainty should not prevent protective actions from being taken.
2 Where there are possibilities of large or irreversible serious effects, action should be
taken, even if there is considerable scientific uncertainty.
The first formulation in the international context appears prominently in the Brundtland
formulation agreed to in the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development (UNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, and recurs in many multilateral
environmental agreements.14 The second formulation appears in some multilateral agree-
ments and in some European Union (EU) directives on environmental protection.15
In the US, a precautionary approach has been applied in various ways in decisions
about health, safety and the environment for about 30 years, much longer than recent
commentaries would have us believe, and earlier than the appearance of the precau-
tionary principle in European law.16 In interpreting congressional legislation, the US
courts have argued that federal regulatory agencies are permitted, and sometimes
required, to protect workers even when the evidence is ‘on the frontiers of scientific
knowledge’ and to protect public health from emissions to air with ‘an ample or
adequate margin of safety’ by ‘erring on the side of caution’. One scholar seeks to make
a distinction between a precautionary approach and the precautionary principle,
asserting that ‘with rare exceptions, US law balances precaution against other considera-
tions, most importantly costs’ and, hence, is better described as a preference, rather than
a principle.17 I find this distinction superficial, or at least unhelpful, if not often inaccu-
rate; and when understood within the context of Roman/Napoleonic law-based
European legal systems preferring ‘codes’ to court-based evolution of common law, this
is a semantic rather than a real distinction. 
In the US, in a series of industry challenges to regulations, courts acknowledged that
even in the case where the scientific basis for a threat to health or the environment is not
compelling, regulators have the discretion to ‘err on the side of caution’, often without
laying down a specific requirement to do so, although the directive to do so is often
found in the enabling legislation of various regulatory regimes. As we shall see in the
section on ‘The politics of regulating chemicals in the US’, under Chevron,18 court defer-
ence to agency policy judgments initially not only allowed, but encouraged, agencies to
take a precautionary approach under a myriad of legislation, partly by relegating ques-
tions of the sufficiency of scientific evidence to the province of discretionary policy-
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making. In the early environmental decisions, rather than adopting stringent interpreta-
tions of statutory language requiring ‘substantial evidence’ in meeting the burden of
proof for agencies to act, the courts adopted a deferential stance towards early environ-
mental agency decisions, allowing them to relax the evidentiary showings in furtherance
of protective public policy goals. 
In the last decade or two, the precautionary inclinations of the American and Anglo-
Saxon jurisprudential systems, as well as codified expressions of the precautionary prin-
ciple in German law, for example, have found their way into multilateral environmental
agreements and international law. Principle 15 of the Declaration of the 1992 UNCED
(the Rio Declaration) states:
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely used by
States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious and irreversible
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-
effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.
This is perhaps the best known, and often cited, statement of the precautionary prin-
ciple. Note, especially, that the word ‘approach’ rather than ‘principle’ is used, and
considerations of cost are certainly present in the phrases ‘according to their capabili-
ties’ and ‘cost-effective measures’. Nonetheless, it is acknowledged to be a principle – but
one to be balanced in one way or another against other principles – no different than the
situation in US law.19 Curiously, this statement of the principle is expressed in the nega-
tive – uncertainty should not be used to delay protection – rather than a statement that
protection should be embraced deliberatively even in the face of uncertainty (a subtle
but important distinction), a formulation often more positively expressed in US case
law.20 The debate in Europe today is not whether the precautionary principle is a prin-
ciple, but which formulation should be applied and whether it trumps other interna-
tional law, particularly the manner in which risk assessment is addressed and is relevant
to trade law involving the World Trade Organization (WTO).21
REGULATORY DECISION-MAKING FRAMEWORK
Whether taking a utilitarian approach that maximizes total welfare, ensuring that the
costs and benefits are equal or commensurate, or seeking to protect certain beneficiaries
with minimal considerations given to the costs of doing so in the face of scientific uncer-
tainty, a regulatory agency responsible for protecting health, safety or the environment
necessarily needs to answer whether, where, when, how and to what extent to intervene.
Intervention could involve:
• notifying those (possibly) affected – for example, by warnings or labels;
• regulating exposure by limiting and controlling exposure or limiting production;
• eliminating production or use;
• treating those affected;
• compensating for harm.
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Answering these questions, in turn, requires asking:
• What are the criteria for deciding?
• Who has the burden of persuasion?
• What strength of evidence (burden of proof) triggers a requirement for what action? 
This framework can be approached either through rational choice theory using cost-
benefit analysis (see the following section on ‘A capsule history of US chemical regula-
tion and the use of the precautionary principle in US law’) or by using a precautionary
approach. Note that far from representing a binary approach (go, no go), the precau-
tionary approach requires application at each juncture of decision-making – whether,
where, when, how, and to what extent to intervene.22
THE POLITICS OF REGULATING
CHEMICALS IN THE US23
The 1970s ushered in a period of intense environmental and workplace regulation. With
the advent of the Reagan administration in 1980 and continuing more or less since then,
the US beneficiaries have experienced a reversal of fortune in the decline of protection.
In contrast, Europe began to take the lead in environmental health and safety regula-
tion, ‘trading places’ with the US.24 In the US, the decline of protection was effectuated
through changes in:
• legislation;
• administrative practice by the executive branch through actions of the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB);
• direct congressional intervention;
• agency policy/practices in standard-setting and subsequent judicial review by the
appellate courts; and 
• extra-legal (i.e. political) activities compromising the government’s duty to protect. 
This section addresses the first three and the last of these developments, while the next
section discusses key health, safety and environmental decisions made by the regulatory
agencies. In contrast to the EU, over the last few decades, the executive branch of
government exercised much more control and direction over the practice of risk assess-
ment and cost-benefit analysis than its EU counterparts. 
Congressional legislation
During the 1990s, the US Congress turned its attention to the impacts of agency rule-
making on the regulated community, and enacted a series of laws designed to reduce
those impacts. The genesis of these laws was the 1994 election, when the Republican
party regained control of both houses of Congress for the first time in several years. Led
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by the then Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, the Republicans brought with them an
aggressive legislative agenda that they termed their ‘Contract with America’. A chief
plank in this agenda was ‘regulatory reform,’ which, broadly speaking, meant mini-
mizing the costs and other burdens imposed by federal regulation on business and state
and local government. A key goal of this reform movement was that all, or virtually all,
federal regulation should be required to meet a cost-benefit criterion, which would have
required a reduction in the stringency of those regulations whose costs were deemed not
to be justified by the associated benefits. Although Congress came close to passing such
sweeping legislation, it did not do so. However, Congress did enact two laws during this
period that have had an impact on agency rule-making, especially in the areas of health,
safety and the environment.
The first of these was the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act,25 passed in 1995. This act
requires that an agency prepare ‘a qualitative and quantitative assessment of the antici-
pated costs and benefits’ of any proposed ‘major’ rule (defined as a regulation whose
aggregate impact is anticipated to be US$100 million or more in any given year), unless
the preparation of such an assessment ‘is otherwise prohibited by law.’26 The statute also
specifies, in some detail, the contents of the required cost-benefit assessment. Since
many federal rules will exceed the US$100 million threshold, this law effectively imposes
a cost-benefit ‘overlay’ on major federal regulation. It is important to note, however, that
this law does not require an agency to abandon its particular statutory mandate in favour
of balancing costs and benefits. That is, it does not impose cost benefit as a substantive
decision-making criterion. Nonetheless, by requiring the agency to calculate the costs
and benefits of major regulations, and to place this information into the administrative
record, Congress clearly has elevated the importance of the cost-benefit criterion.
A year later, in 1996, Congress called for further review of agency decision-making with
the passage of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act.27 A key aspect of
this law was a series of amendments strengthening a 1980 statute known as the
Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA).28 As amended, the RFA requires all agencies to publish
a ‘regulatory flexibility analysis’ with any proposed or final rule likely to have a significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. The analysis published with
a proposed rule is to include, among other things, ‘a description of any significant alter-
natives to the proposed rule … which minimize any significant impact of the proposed
rule on small entities’.29 The analysis published with a final rule, in turn, is to include ‘a
description of the steps the agency has taken to minimize the significant economic
impact on small entities’, and a statement of the ‘factual, policy, and legal reasons’ why
the approach taken in the final rule was selected instead of the other regulatory alterna-
tives considered.30
The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act also imposes a substantive directive, albeit a
‘soft’ one, on major federal regulations. For any proposed regulation meeting the mone-
tary threshold identified above, the agency must ‘identify and consider a reasonable
number of alternatives, and from those alternatives select the least costly, most cost-
effective and least burdensome alternative that achieves the objectives of the rule’.31 The
agency can avoid this requirement, however, if it publishes ‘an explanation of why the
least costly, most cost-effective or least burdensome method of achieving the objectives of
the rule was not adopted’, or if the requirement is ‘inconsistent with law’.32 The focus of
this latter exception would seem to be situations in which the agency’s substantive
THE LEGACY OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN US LAW 357
Precautionary19.qxd  27/11/2006  11:40  Page 357
mandate requires it to prefer a certain regulatory result even if it is not the cheapest
effective alternative. In general, however, the directive to select the most cost effective of
those alternatives that will fulfil an agency’s mandate should not, in itself, require the
agency to compromise its substantive mandate.
During the mid 1990s, Congress also considered, but did not pass, legislation that
would have required agencies to perform a detailed risk assessment, according to speci-
fied criteria, before promulgating health, safety and environmental regulation. While it
did not pass broad legislation of this nature, however, Congress did include risk assess-
ment provisions in its 1996 amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act, the statute
under which the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) establishes health criteria
for public drinking water supplies. Under these new provisions, risk assessments
conducted under the act must be based on ‘the best available peer-reviewed science and
supporting studies conducted in accordance with sound and objective scientific prac-
tices’, and on ‘data collected by accepted methods or best available methods (if the reli-
ability of the method and the nature of the decision justifies the use of the data)’.33 Such
a requirement can be expected to have an impact on the substance of environmental
regulation.
During 2000, in the waning days of the Clinton administration, Congress enacted the
Information (Data) Quality Act, which added a short rider to an appropriations bill. The
law, which was supported and largely written by business groups, directs the Office of
Management and Budget to ‘issue guidelines … that provide policy and procedural
guidance to federal agencies for ensuring and maximizing the quality, objectivity, utility
and integrity of information (including statistical information) disseminated by federal
agencies’.34 Because it establishes guidelines for the ‘quality, objectivity, utility and
integrity’ of scientific data used by federal agencies, and because it also affords interested
parties the right to challenge an agency’s adherence to those guidelines, the law can be
expected to have a significant effect on agency rule-making if it is vigorously enforced.35
The OMB has since issued detailed guidelines for good guidance practices performing
cost-benefit analysis36 and cost-effective analysis.37 The EPA has issued guidelines for
carcinogenic risk assessment.38 Together, these guidance documents influence the
course and tenor of regulatory rule-making. 
Unless there is a concomitant increase in agency resources, legislation that expands
the responsibilities that an agency must fulfil before issuing its regulations – such as by
requiring a cost-benefit analysis or a complicated risk assessment – will tend to reduce
the number of regulations that the agency can promulgate because of the substantial
burdens placed on regulatory agency resources. It also adds a chilling effect on agencies
promulgating stringent regulations because of conservative constraints placed upon the
actual undertaking of risk assessments.
Additional executive branch influence through the Office of Management
and Budget
Administrative agencies sit within the executive branch. Accordingly, the executive also
exercises considerable control over agency decision-making. Much of the executive’s
influence over the direction of an agency stems from the president’s control of the
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appointment process. Most statutes that create an administrative agency also permit the
president to appoint the agency’s top decision-makers (the so-called political appoint-
ments), subject to the approval of the US Senate. The power to appoint includes the
power to remove from office, along with all of the more subtle means of persuasion that
lie between the two. The underlying theory, presumably, is that each new administration
should be free, within the bounds of the applicable statutory mandates, to chart the
direction of the agencies that operate within its purview. However, this approach often
entails an inherent conflict because the direction favoured by the administration
frequently differs from that favoured by Congress. This appears to be an accepted part of
the political process.
The executive branch also wields considerable influence over the agencies through
the budget process. Although final approval of the national budget rests with Congress,
the budget is shaped, in large part, by the proposed budget submitted to Congress by the
president. Even more directly than Congress, then, the executive branch can use its grip
on the national purse strings to expand the size of those regulatory programmes that it
favours and to contract the size of those it does not. Furthermore, since 1980, the presi-
dent has used the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to oversee an economic
analysis of all proposed major regulations. This has had a significant effect on the regula-
tory initiatives proposed by the EPA, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
President Reagan’s 1981 Executive Order 12291 (the core substance of which remains
in effect under a 1993 executive order issued by President Clinton) required the OMB to
review significant new regulatory actions to ensure that the potential benefits to society
outweigh the potential costs, with such benefits and costs to be quantified in monetary
terms. In essence, this order imposed the cost-benefit criterion as a prerequisite to prom-
ulgation of federal regulations. The OMB has used the review authority granted by this
order to delay the promulgation of several regulations. A precursor to this executive
order was President Ford’s 1974 Executive Order 11821, which required that all regula-
tions issued by executive branch agencies should be accompanied by an inflationary
impact statement, where ‘inflationary’ was defined by the Council on Wage and Price
Stability as a situation in which the costs of the regulation exceeded the benefits.
However, it did not require that the regulation should not be inflationary, but only that
the inflationary impacts should be evaluated. Similarly, President Carter’s Executive
Order 12044 required federal agencies to analyse the economic consequences of signifi-
cant regulations and their alternatives, though it imposed no cost-benefit requirement.
Although President Clinton’s 1993 executive order expressly revokes President Reagan’s
order,39 it incorporates many of its basic concepts and retains the cost-benefit review as a
key part of the OMB’s role. 
The Clinton order requires agencies to submit detailed information on anticipated
costs and benefits for OMB review before they take any ‘significant regulatory action’,
which is defined as an action that is likely to result in a rule that may have ‘an annual
effect on the economy of US$100 million or more’, that may ‘adversely affect in a mate-
rial way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the envi-
ronment, public health or safety, or state, local, or tribal governments or communities’,
or that may meet another of the criteria enumerated therein. The cost-and-benefit infor-
mation submitted is to be quantified ‘to the extent feasible’.40 The OMB, in turn, is
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directed to ‘provide meaningful guidance and oversight so that each agency’s regulatory
actions are consistent with applicable law, the president’s priorities and the principles set
forth in the executive order’.41 The cost-benefit criterion is incorporated within the
following Principle of Regulation stated in the order:
Each agency shall assess both the costs and benefits of the intended regulation and,
recognizing that some costs and benefits are difficult to quantify, propose or adopt a
regulation only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended regula-
tion justify its costs.42
The OMB has sought to impose the cost-benefit criterion on agency decision-making
even when the underlying statute has required that the regulation be promulgated
according to criteria other than cost-benefit balancing. It uses this criterion in its review
of workplace health regulations proposed by the OSHA, for example, even though the
Supreme Court has held that such regulations are to be set according to technological
and economic feasibility, and not according to a weighing of costs and benefits.43 This
approach contravenes the executive order’s directive that the OMB endeavour to ensure
that agency regulation is ‘consistent with applicable law’.
The philosophical tension between Congress and the president on the cost-benefit
issue would appear to have been lessened by the former’s embrace of the cost-benefit
criterion in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995. As discussed earlier, however,
this law applies to a more limited class of ‘major’ regulations and does not require that
the benefits of a regulation outweigh its costs. 
The OMB has a limited, congressionally delegated authority to influence the content of
agency regulations under the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA).44 The general purpose of
the PRA is to reduce the public and private burdens incident to government data-
gathering activities, and the act directs the OMB to oversee the work of other agencies in
order to achieve this objective.
Direct congressional intervention in agency rules
A second key aspect of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act discussed
above was the creation of the Congressional Review Act (CRA).45 As its name suggests, the
CRA was designed to facilitate congressional review of agency rule-making. It requires
that, before a final rule takes effect, the promulgating agency provides a report to
Congress that includes, among other things, ‘a complete copy of the cost-benefit analysis
of the rule, if any’, and the regulatory flexibility analyses prepared under the Regulatory
Flexibility Act. If the regulation is a ‘major’ rule under the Unfunded Mandates Reform
Act, it does not take effect until 60 days after this report has been submitted, unless the
president determines that the rule should take effect immediately because one of four
designated criteria has been satisfied.46 This is intended to give the members of Congress
time to review the regulation and, if they choose, to debate its merits. Moreover, Congress
may (subject to a potential presidential veto) nullify any rule submitted under the CRA
and prevent it from taking effect by passing a ‘joint resolution of disapproval’.47 Congress
did exactly this when it repealed an OSHA standard on ergonomics in 2001.
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Extra-legal activities compromising protection of health, safety and the
environment
Aside from legislative and executive policy initiatives that have the effect of reducing
protection of health, safety and the environment by imposing a cost-benefit calculus and
formalistic risk assessment conventions upon regulatory agencies, two other areas of
activity have seriously reversed earlier trends towards a precautionary approach: the
political purging of agency science advisory boards and the selective removal of environ-
mental scientists from study sections that review research grants by the agencies,48 and
the gradual replacement of members of the judiciary, at both the circuit court and
Supreme Court level, with anti-regulatory ideologues.49
A CAPSULE HISTORY OF US CHEMICAL
REGULATION AND THE USE OF THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN US LAW
The history of the use of the precautionary approach in US law contrasts with that in the
EU. Whereas in the EU, the precautionary principle appears first in food safety and then
moves slowly to develop in environmental regulations and is yet to find full expression in
the regulation of occupational health and safety, in the US, it begins strongly and
emphatically in worker health and safety, then in the environment, and is weakly
expressed in food safety law. In fact, interpretations of what constitutes sufficient scien-
tific evidence and how precautionary agencies should be are given their strongest
expression in occupational health and safety law,50 which profoundly affects the develop-
ment of these considerations in the environmental area.
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 197051
The Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHAct) of 1970 specifically addresses the
subject of toxic substances. It states, under Section 6(b)(5) of the act, that the secretary
of labour, through the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), in
promulgating permanent standards dealing with toxic materials or harmful physical
agents, shall set the standard that:
… most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available
evidence that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional
capacity, even if such employee has a regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by such
standard for the period of his working life [emphasis added].52
Standards promulgated under this section of the act are reviewable by the circuit courts
of appeal; the standard of judicial review is ‘substantial evidence on the record as a
whole’.53
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The case Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v Hodgson,54 promulgated a more strin-
gent regulation for asbestos – at the time regarded as a lung toxin causing asbestosis, but
not a carcinogen – and the industry challenged the standard, arguing that there was
insufficient evidence to justify lowering the permissible exposure limit. In deferring to
the agency’s determination that a more protective level was needed, the DC Court of
Appeals held that:
Some of the questions involved in the promulgation of these standards are on the fron-
tiers of scientific knowledge, and consequently … insufficient data is presently available
to make a fully informed factual determination … it rests, in the final analysis, on an
essentially legislative policy judgment, rather than a factual determination, concerning
the relative risks of under-protection as opposed to overprotection.
One might regard this as an articulation of the permissive use of the precautionary
principle.
In a subsequent case, The Society of Plastics Industry, Inc v Occupational Safety and Health
Administration,55 concerning an industry challenge to a very stringent OSHA standard of
allowing no more than 1 part per million (ppm) exposure over an eight-hour period to
the carcinogen vinyl chloride, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reiterated the
rationale in Industrial Union above, adding: ‘Under the command of OSHA, it remains
the duty of the secretary to act to protect the working man, and to act where existing
methodology or research is deficient.’ Here, applying a precautionary approach appears
to be mandatory, rather than permissible, even under industry protests that achieving
the standard was not technologically feasible.
These cases profoundly influenced the extent to which the Environmental Protection
Agency regulated air pollutants under the 1970 Clean Air Act (amended in 1977 and
1990) and attempted to regulate toxic substances under the 1976 Toxic Substances
Control Act.
After industry testing revealed formaldehyde to be an animal carcinogen in 1979,
during the 1980s, under President Reagan, the OSHA initially did nothing to follow up
on the prior Carter administration’s intent to regulate it.56 Regulatory agency decisions
‘not to act’, while technically reviewable by appellate courts, are notoriously difficult to
counter. Ultimately, in 1992, 13 years after the animal study, the OSHA was forced to
regulate formaldehyde, but chose to place the most minimal restrictions possible on
allowable exposure, permitting lifetime risks of greater than 10–3 following the directives
emanating from the Supreme Court benzene case discussed immediately below. 
In a 1980 case involving the industry challenge to an OSHA regulation of the
carcinogen benzene at 1 ppm over an eight-hour period, the appellate process reached
the Supreme Court. In Industrial Union Department v American Petroleum Institute,57 the
Supreme Court added a requirement, with dubious legal justification, to the OSHAct
that only ‘significant risks’ could be regulated under the toxic substances provision of
the OSHAct. The court remanded the standard to OSHA to determine whether benzene
exposure at 1 ppm was ‘significant’, offering guidance that ‘significance’ should lie
somewhere between a lifetime risk of 10–3 (a clearly significant risk) and 10–9 (a clearly
insignificant risk). The OSHA, under President Reagan, chose the ‘bright line’ at the
least permissibly protective level of 10–3. This heralded the end of the precautionary era
362 THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND CHEMICALS
Precautionary19.qxd  27/11/2006  11:40  Page 362
in toxic substances regulation. Although President Clinton subsequently could have
drawn the line differently, he did not change it. 
The OSHA can also administratively and immediately establish ‘temporary emergency
standards’ under the OSHAct; but much discretion is left to the OSHA to determine
whether the requirements of a ‘necessity to prevent grave danger’ prevails in a particular
case.58 In addition, there is a provision in the OSHAct that authorizes the OSHA to go to
a federal district court (a court of first instance) to restrain or halt an industrial opera-
tion in the case of imminent dangers.59
In addition to complying with specific standards, employers are also under a ‘general
duty’ to provide workplaces and work free from ‘recognized hazards likely to cause death
or serious bodily harm’.60 Again, defining what constitutes a ‘recognized hazard’ is left to
the discretion of the OSHA.
Thus, what first appears as an emerging mandatory requirement to apply the precau-
tionary principle for worker protection disappears after the benzene case into the abyss
of agency discretion dominated by industry interests.
The 1970 Clean Air Act (CAA) (and amendments of 1977 and 1990)61, 62
The 1970 Clean Air Act (CAA) regulated both criteria pollutants (carbon monoxide,
sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, particulates, ozone and lead) under CAA Section
109,63 and so-called hazardous pollutants under CAA Section 112.64 Federal ambient air
quality (concentration) standards were established for the former, and federal emission
standards were to be established for the latter. The standard of judicial review in the DC
Circuit Court of Appeals is ‘arbitrary or capricious’. The ambient air quality standards
were to be set by the EPA to protect public health ‘with an adequate margin of safety’
without consideration of economic costs; they were to be achieved through state-
imposed emission levels in state permits on existing sources and through state-enforced
federal emission limitations on new sources,65 the latter taking economic burdens into
account while permitting the standards to be ‘technology forcing’ in stringency. 
The leading case interpreting standard-setting for criteria pollutants, Lead Industries
Association, Inc v Environmental Protection Agency, addressed a new standard for airborne
lead compound particulates.66 There, the DC Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the
EPA that ‘Congress directed the administrator to err on the side of caution in making the
necessary decisions’ (emphasis added). Furthermore, the court agreed with the EPA that:
• Congress made it abundantly clear that considerations of economic or technological
feasibility are to be subordinated to the goal of protecting the public health by
prohibiting any consideration of such factors.
• [I]t specified that the air quality standards must also protect individuals who are
particularly sensitive to the effects of pollution.
• [I]t required that the standards be set at a level at which there is ‘an absence of
adverse effect’ on these sensitive individuals.
• [I]t specifically directed the Administrator to allow an adequate margin of safety in
setting primary air quality standards in order to provide some protection against
effects that research has not yet uncovered. 
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It is hard to imagine a stronger endorsement of the precautionary principle. Note the
absence of any specific reference to irreversibility of damage or persistence or biomagni-
fication of the pollutant in the environment or the human body. But do note the specific
concern for sensitive individuals, the explicit rejection of cost-benefit balancing, and the
endorsement of action ‘against effects that research has not yet uncovered’. But the
precautionary approach was not long lived in the agency. Ronald Reagan won a two-term
presidency in 1980 and 1984 and dramatically changed the landscape of US environ-
mental regulation. 
For hazardous air pollutants, the 1970 CAA similarly directed the EPA to set emission
standards ‘at the level which, in his judgment, provides an ample margin of safety to
protect the public health’.67 Departing from the rationale in Lead Industries, in an
industry challenge to the EPA proposed emission standard for vinyl chloride, writing for
a three-judge panel of the DC Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Robert Bork in Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc v Environmental Protection Agency68 opined:
We find that the congressional mandate to provide ‘an ample margin of safety’ ‘to
protect the public health’ requires the Administrator to make an initial determination of
what is ‘safe … [T]he administrator’s decision does not require a finding that ‘safe’
means ‘risk free’ or a finding that the determination is free from uncertainty. Instead, we
find only that the Administrator’s decision must be based upon an expert judgment with
regard to the level of emission that will result in an ‘acceptable’ risk to health… This
determination must be based solely upon the risk to health. The Administrator cannot
under any circumstances consider cost and technological feasibility at this stage of the
analysis …
Congress, however, recognized in Section 112 that the determination of what is ‘safe’
will always be marked by scientific uncertainty and thus exhorted the administrator to
set emission standards that will provide an ‘ample margin’ of safety. This language
permits the administrator to take into account scientific uncertainty and to use expert
discretion to determine what action should be taken in light of that uncertainty.
Congress authorized and, indeed, required EPA to protect against dangers before their
extent is conclusively ascertained. Under the ‘ample margin of safety’ directive, EPA’s
standards must protect against incompletely understood dangers to public health and
the environment, in addition to well-known risks …
We wish to reiterate the limited nature of our holding in this case because it is not the
court’s intention to bind the administrator to any specific method of determining what
is ‘safe’ or what constitutes an ‘ample margin’. We hold only that the administrator
cannot consider cost and technological feasibility in determining what is ‘safe’.
Unable to shake the clear congressional intent in Section 112 to require standards to be
set in the face of considerable scientific uncertainty and without regard to economic or
technological feasibility, the three-judge panel of the DC Circuit invented a de minimis
risk requirement to soften the blow. This case prompted Congress to amend Section 112
of the CAA in the 1990 CAA amendments to allow a technology-based approach to be
used, directing the EPA to set technology-based emission standards (based on maximum
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achievable control technology) established on the level achievable by the ‘average’
performance of the top 12 per cent of the industry.69 The EPA could establish more strin-
gent emission standards for new sources.70 Where technology-based standards were not
practical, the EPA could resort to a health-based approach, protecting the public health
with an ample margin of safety,71 the original mandate of the 1970 CAA. Congress
expressly provided that, ultimately, carcinogenic chemicals cannot present a risk greater
than a 10–6 lifetime risk.72
In a later challenge to the EPA’s revised standards for the criteria pollutants ozone and
particulates, in Environmental Protection Agency v American Trucking Associations, Inc,73 the
Supreme Court reinforced the correctness of the lead case criteria, with concurring
Justice Stephen Breyer echoing Judge Bork’s rationale that protecting public health with
an ‘adequate margin of safety’ does not mean a world that is ‘free of all risk’.
Appellate court deference to the agencies as to what constitutes tolerable de minimis
risks or significant risks that must be demonstrated in order to be regulated is a ‘back
door’ pathway to reducing a precautionary approach by allowing risk assessments that do
not clearly show calculable significant risks to justify non-action. Furthermore, by
compromising the independence of agency science advisory boards and by eliminating
research grants to scientists who do not think ‘the right way’, the federal government has
greatly compromised the independence and integrity of science in the political
process.74
The 1976 Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)75
Under the 1976 Toxics Substances Control Act (TSCA), the EPA must set standards for
substances that present or will present ‘unreasonable risks to health or the environ-
ment’,76 taking into account costs, effects on health and the environment, technological
innovation and substitutes.77 The EPA requires industry to test chemicals78 if there is
insufficient data and the substance ‘may present unreasonable risks to health or the envi-
ronment’ or if there is a substantial quantity produced or exposure is deemed to be
significant. If there may be a reasonable basis to conclude that a chemical presents (or
will present) a ‘significant’ risk of cancer, mutation or birth defects, the EPA must either
regulate or explain why it has chosen not too – that is, why the risk is not ‘unreason-
able’.79 Upon challenge, any federal court of appeal can examine the standards to ensure
that they are based on ‘substantial evidence on the record as a whole’ (the same standard
of judicial review found in the OSHAct).80 As with the OSHAct, the TSCA provides for
emergency measures81 and imminent hazards.82 Under the TSCA, the EPA also requires
industry to report ‘significant adverse reactions’ and information about their products’
toxicity.83
Asbestos, the most notorious carcinogen known in the context of workplace,
consumer and environmental exposure, did receive EPA attention during the 1980s.
The EPA decided to ban the substance under the TSCA for many uses; but the standard
was remanded to the agency for reconsideration by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Corrosion Proof Fittings v EPA.84 As stated above, the TSCA requires the EPA to consider,
along with the toxic effects on human health and the environment, ‘the benefits of such
substance[s] and mixture[s] and the availability of substitutes for such uses’ (emphasis
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added). Because the EPA did not explore regulatory options other than a ban, and, more
specifically, because the EPA did not evaluate the toxicity (and costs) of likely substitute
products85 in a search for ‘least burdensome requirements’, the court vacated the
proposed standard and remanded it to the EPA for further proceedings. While, arguably,
the court incorrectly interpreted the TSCA’s requirements regarding mandating substi-
tutes’ toxicity (and cost) comparisons (the TSCA mentions only that the ‘availability’ of
substitutes must be considered) and could have sought to establish regulation in another
circuit court to give a more favourable result concerning what criteria need to be met in
order to regulate, the EPA chose not to reinstate the asbestos ban, primarily because of
the likely extensive burden on agency resources to perform extensive risk and economic
assessments for substitutes. For all intents and purposes, the EPA regards the TSCA as a
‘dead letter’.86 The analytic burdens placed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals effec-
tively emasculated the TSCA regulation in the US.
RECLAIMING HEALTH, SAFETY AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
The precautionary principle has been criticized as being both too vague and too arbi-
trary to form a basis for rational decision-making. The assumption underlying this criti-
cism is that any scheme not based on cost-benefit analysis and risk assessment is both
irrational and without secure foundation in either science or economics. This section
contests that view and makes explicit the rational tenets of the precautionary principle
within an analytical framework – trade-off analysis – which is as rigorous as uncertainties
permit, and one that mirrors democratic values embodied in regulatory, compensatory
and common law. It offers an approach to making decisions within an analytic frame-
work, based on equity and justice, to replace the economic paradigm of utilitarian cost-
benefit analysis. As will be seen, the strength of trade-off analysis is that it explicitly takes
into account who bears the costs and who reaps the benefits.87 This feature of trade-off
analysis mirrors the increasing EU tendency to balance ‘interests’ rather than costs and
benefits.88
The limits of cost-benefit analysis in addressing distributional concerns
During the past two decades, cost-benefit analysis has become the dominant method
used by policy-makers to evaluate government intervention in the areas of health, safety
and the environment. In theory, cost-benefit analysis of a policy option enumerates all
possible consequences, both positive and negative; estimates the probability of each; esti-
mates the benefit or loss to society should each occur, expressed in monetary terms;
computes the expected social benefit or loss from each consequence by multiplying the
amount of the associated benefit or loss by its probability of occurrence; and computes
the net expected social benefit or loss associated with the government policy by summing
over the various possible consequences.89 The reference point for these calculations is
the state of the economy in the absence of the government policy, termed the ‘baseline’. 
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The mechanics of constructing a cost-benefit analysis can be seen with reference to
Table 19.1, which presents a relatively disaggregated matrix of the various positive and
negative consequences of a government policy for a variety of actors. The consequences
are first separated into economic, health and safety, and environmental effects, and
those affected are organized into policy-relevant groups of actors, such as producers,
workers, consumers and ‘others’. Initially, the consequences are represented in their
natural units: economic effects are expressed in monetary units; health and safety effects
are expressed in mortality and morbidity terms; and environmental effects are expressed
in damage to ecosystems, etc. Economic analysis is used to evaluate monetary costs and
benefits related to economic effects. Health and environmental risk assessments inform
the entries in the last two columns of the matrix. 
All of the consequences of a candidate policy (or regulation) are described fully in
terms of the times during which they occur. What traditional cost-benefit analysis does is
translate all of these consequences into ‘equivalent’ monetary units. This poses two prob-
lems. One is the difficulty, even arbitrariness, of placing a monetary value on human life,
health and safety and a healthy environment. Another is that by translating all of these
consequences into equivalent monetary units, discounting each to current value (since a
US$/Euro invested now is expected to earn interest over time), and aggregating them
into a single US$/Euro value intended to express the net social effect of the government
policy, the effects on the economy from investing now in future health, safety and envi-
ronmental benefits are weighted far more heavily than those benefits that occur in the
future, including those to future generations.
As a decision-making tool, cost-benefit analysis offers several compelling advantages. It
clarifies choices among alternatives by evaluating consequences systematically. It
professes to foster an open and fair policy-making process by making explicit the esti-
mates of costs and benefits and the assumptions upon which those estimates are based.
And by expressing all gains and losses in monetary terms, cost-benefit analysis permits the
total impact of a policy to be summarized in a single US$/Euro figure (cost-effectiveness
analysis relies on a benefit-to-cost ratio, rather than a net benefit calculus, but otherwise
shares the other weaknesses of a cost-benefit approach).
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Table 19.1 Matrix of policy consequences for different actors
Group Economic effects Health/safety effects Environmental effects
Producers C$
Workers C$ BH/S
Consumers C$ BH/S
Others C$ BH/S BEnvironment
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This final step, however, may be stretching analytic techniques one step too far. An alter-
native approach, called trade-off analysis, begins in the same way as does cost-benefit
analysis, but does not aggregate like effects into a single benefit or cost stream, and it
stops short of assigning monetary values to non-monetary consequences. Instead, all
effects are described in their natural units. The time period in which each effect is expe-
rienced is fully revealed; but future effects are not discounted to present value. All kinds
of uncertainties are fully described: risk, probability distributions and indeterminacy. It
is not possible to know what we don’t know (ignorance), but confidence that we have
fully described the world is a proxy for a belief that ignorance is not likely to be a
problem. Trade-offs between worker health or environmental improvements and costs
to producers and consumers are made apparent because the different cost and benefit
elements are not aggregated.
Using trade-off analysis, politically accountable decision-makers could make policy
choices in a transparent manner. Who bears the costs and who reaps the benefits from a
policy option would not be hidden in a single aggregate US$/Euro figure. Decisions
would be based on accountability rather than accounting. Note that while cost benefit is
formulaic – that is, a single figure of merit is sought for a policy/regulation, such as the
‘net benefit’ or a ‘benefit-to-cost ratio’ – trade-off analysis seeks to ‘bound the set of not
clearly incorrect – that is, unfair – decisions’. This has important implications for policy
choices. Under a cost-benefit framework, one can easily demand prioritization of risk-
reduction options based on the ranking of net benefits or cost-benefit ratios – with
choices representing violations of the ranking being allegedly inconsistent or irrational.
However, where large uncertainties exist, and the distributions of risks and benefits are
of concern, there is no uniquely correct prioritization scheme or metric demanding
‘consistency’. Advances in risk assessment techniques and economic analysis that takes
technological innovation into account through the deliberate undertaking of
Technology Options Analysis (see below) can narrow the uncertainties, but can never
provide a unique best answer. That process, ultimately, has to reflect political, social and
value judgments – preferably informed by public participation/stakeholder processes
and transparent for all to see. Taking care to include concerns for effects, their uncer-
tainties and their distributional consequences – that is, exercising precaution – in order
to make responsible, accountable decisions is possible using trade-off analysis, but not
cost-benefit analysis.
Promoting rational technology choices
One important element often left out of the traditional cost-benefit matrix has been the
consideration of technological alternatives.90 Regulatory agencies have a mixed history
in making information about cleaner and safer technologies available and promoting
their adoption. Agencies could help to prevent pollution and accidents by helping firms
to think about their technological options in a more formal and systematic fashion.
Options for technological change must be considered according to a variety of
criteria, including economic, environmental, and health and safety factors. Identifying
these options and comparing them against the technology in use is called Technology
Options Analysis.91 Unlike traditional technology assessment, Technology Options
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Analysis does not require absolute quantification of all of the variables: one has only to
demonstrate, in a comparative manner, that one technology is better or worse than
another in performance, health, safety, ecological effects and so forth. It is likely to be
less sensitive to initial assumptions than, for example, cost-benefit analysis, and would
enable industry and government to identify more creative cost-effective solutions.
Government might require industries to undertake Technology Options Analysis instead
of traditional technology assessment focusing on technologies already existing within, or
easily accessible to, the firm or industry. The latter would likely address only the tech-
nologies that industry puts forward; it may thus miss the opportunity of identifying and
subsequently influencing the adoption or development of superior technological
options.92
Once superior existing technologies – or technologies within easy reach – are identi-
fied, industries may be motivated to change their technology out of economic self-
interest or in order to avoid future liability. On the other hand, government might either
force the adoption or development of new technology, or provide technical or financial
assistance. Requiring firms to change technology can itself be a risky venture. Adopting a
technology new to a firm or industry introduces new uncertainties and financial risks. If
this is done, policy should allow for error and accommodate industry for failures in bona
fide attempts to develop new technologies – for example, by allowing more time or
sharing the financial risk. Developing a new technology may often not be possible for the
incumbent polluting or dangerous firm. New entrants displacing the dominant or
prevailing technology may be required. To adopt environmental, health or safety
requirements in this case takes considerable political courage; but the options of doing
so should not be ignored.93
Whichever route government takes, the precautionary principle requires the investi-
gation of technology options for developing and adopting cleaner and inherently safer
(sustainable) technologies.
Which errors are worse?
Policy-makers must address both uncertainty about the nature and extent of health,
safety or environmental risks, and about the performance of an alternative technology.
First, they must choose whether to err on the side of caution or risk. With regard to the
first type of uncertainty – scientific uncertainty – two mistakes can be made. A ‘type I’
error is committed if society regulates an activity that appears to be hazardous, but turns
out later to be harmless (a ‘false positive’ in the parlance of experimental findings) and
resources are needlessly expended. Another error, a ‘type II’ error is committed if society
fails to regulate an activity because the evidence is not initially thought to be strong
enough, but that finally turns out to be harmful (a ‘false negative’).94
A ‘type III’ error is said to occur when one provides an accurate (or precise) answer to
the wrong problem.95 Not taking into account opportunities to change technology
restricts the decision-maker to ‘static solutions’ and thus gives rise to the further error of
considering options within ‘bounded rationality’. 
Where uncertainty exists on the technology side, type I errors can be said to be
committed when society mandates the development or adoption of a technology that
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turns out to be much more expensive or less able to reduce risks than anticipated, and
when resources are needlessly or foolishly expended. Type II errors might be said to be
committed when, because of insufficient commitment of resources or political will, a
significant missed opportunity is created by which society fails to force or stimulate signif-
icant risk-reducing technology.96 An important distinction between a cost-benefit
approach and one based on precaution is that the former is ‘risk neutral’ in the
balancing of costs and benefits with their attendant uncertainties, and the latter reflects
‘risk averseness’ for some kinds of errors.
Value judgments clearly affect decisions on whether to tolerate type I or type II errors
with regard to both risk and technology choices. This is because the cost of being wrong in
one instance may be vastly different from the cost of being wrong in another. For
example, banning a chemical essential to a beneficial activity, such as the use of radio
nuclides in medicine, has potentially more drastic consequences than banning a non-
essential chemical for which there is a close, cost-comparable substitute. It may be
perfectly appropriate to rely on ‘most likely estimates’ of risk in the first case and on
‘worst-case analysis’ in the second. A type II error on the technology choice side was
committed in the case of the Montreal Protocol banning chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) by
creating a scheme through which DuPont and ICI, the producers of CFCs, were allowed
to promote the use of their own substitute, hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs), rather
than adopt a more stringent protocol that would have stimulated still better substitutes.
Evaluating errors and deciding which way to lean is not a precise science. However,
making those evaluations and valuations explicit within a trade-off analysis that acknowl-
edges distributional effects, accounts for uncertainties in risk assessments and considers
opportunities for technological change will reveal the preferences upon which policies
are based and may suggest priorities.
CONCLUSIONS
The application and discussion of the precautionary principle have focused on action to
prevent or refrain from contributing to possible serious irreversible harm to health and
the environment – whether on an individual basis or in terms of widespread environ-
mental or health consequences. In particular, the precautionary principle has become
embodied in regulations directed towards persistent and/or bioaccumulative toxic
substances.97 Lately, the principle has been applied to problems attended by indetermi-
nacy and ignorance.
Here it is worth reviewing the fact that the nature of uncertainty in the problems that
now concern health, safety and environmental regulators and advocates is changing.
Formerly, concentrating on the magnitude of risks and their uncertainties – in a proba-
bilistic sense – consumed the attention of the decision-maker. Since better science would
be expected to yield a better basis for decisions, it could be argued that risk management
decisions should await its arrival. Today, problems of indeterminacy and ignorance
increasingly characterize the risks we face. It is no longer a question of waiting for the
science to be developed. The limitations of ‘knowing with greater accuracy’ and ‘not
knowing what we don’t know’ attend – and will continue to attend in the foreseeable
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future – modern day risks and confound so-called rational approaches to dealing with
these hazards. The social concern with genetically modified organisms (GMOs) or with
bioterrorism are examples. The proponents of GMOs deride social attempts to exercise
caution over risks we cannot estimate or imagine; but who is arguing that taking precau-
tion against terrorism is ‘irrational’? Ought we to expect ‘consistency’ in the manage-
ment of highly uncertain (that is, indeterminable or unknowable), possibly catastrophic,
risks? Clearly, a different theoretical framework is needed – one outside of deterministic
rational choice theory.
I have argued elsewhere that the precautionary principle need not be restricted to cases
of irreversibility or large uncertainty of effect.98 If it is, as I contend, an alternative to cost-
benefit analysis, it can be used wherever that approach gives an objectionable outcome.
For example, it might also be applied to mitigate a harm that is ultimately reversible – if
reversing the damage could be more costly than preventing it. And what of the cases in
which there are no uncertainties – for example, when we know that future generations
will be harmed? Cost-benefit analysis is biased against investing heavily in the present to
prevent such future harm because of the use of discounting cost and benefit streams over
time. And there are many situations in which we are aware of our ignorance: for example,
we know that only a very small percentage of all chemicals in commerce have been tested
for toxic effects.99 In these cases, too, precaution is appropriate.
However, it is not the precautionary principle per se that is amenable to replacing cost-
benefit analysis as a ‘decision rule’ for action. Nor does the precautionary principle
replace risk assessment. Attempts to establish a threshold of harm above which the
precautionary principle is triggered, for example, have been less than satisfactory.100
Instead, a precautionary approach or principle is most useful in guiding the selection of
policies, and aiding in the establishment of priorities, in an attempt to deliver justice and
fairness within a more appropriate framework than cost-benefit analysis. Precaution
rightly focuses on uncertainty and irreversibility as two important factors; but others
must be considered as well, particularly technology alternatives. A complete list of the
important elements must include:
• the seriousness and irreversibility of the harm addressed;
• the societal distribution of possible costs and benefits of policies and technologies;
• the technological options for preventing, arresting, reversing or mitigating possible
harm – and the opportunity costs of selecting a given policy option;.
• society’s inclinations regarding erring on the side of caution and erring on the side of
laxity;
• the nature of the uncertainty encountered: classical uncertainty, indeterminacy or ignorance?
Nothing substitutes for a transparent and accessible decision-making framework in
which the values and assumptions are clearly articulated and compared to alternative
approaches. Trade-off analysis makes this possible, but also offers the opportunity to
operationalize the precautionary principle by:
• Minimizing uncertainty through:
– refinement of (comparative) risk analysis; and
– undertaking (comparative) Technology Options Analysis.
THE LEGACY OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN US LAW 371
Precautionary19.qxd  27/11/2006  11:40  Page 371
• Reflecting societal preferences for error avoidance regarding:
– risk avoidance (type I versus type II errors regarding requirements for the reduc-
tion of risk); and
– cost avoidance (type I versus type II errors regarding requirements for changes in
technology).
• Changing the burden of proof through:
– consideration of creating a sliding scale for the burden of proof – that is, the
strength of data/information needed to justify taking (or stopping) action,
depending upon the hazard, extent of protection desired and action taken (noti-
fication, regulation, compensation, etc.); this means linking causality to level of
desired protection.
Much of the discussion of the precautionary principle focuses on cause-and-effect rela-
tionships for which a high statistical confidence level (usually expressed as having a p
value of  0.05 – that is, a small chance of the association being spurious or random) or
a high strength of association is traditionally required in scientific publications. It should
be remembered that the convention of requiring a p value no higher than 0.05 was an
arbitrary historical choice. Critics of those wishing to invoke the precautionary principle
by reducing the strength of causal proof would do well to remember this. In addition,
other ways of knowing besides statistical correlations might be pursued.101
Other standards (burdens) of proof commonly invoked in public policy determina-
tions include, in decreasing order of stringency, ‘strict liability for harm’ (in the area of
compensation, the polluter pays principle is sometimes invoked in statutory language or
by the courts in fashioning equitable relief to victims); ‘clear and convincing evidence’;
‘more probable than not’ or ‘preponderance of the evidence’; ‘substantial cause or
factor’; and ‘contributing factor’. This sliding scale of evidentiary strength can be
thought of as invoking the precautionary principle by expanding the ‘allowable possible
error’ in factual determinations. An alternative to shifting the burden of proof that
lessens the burden of proof required to trigger an intervention to prevent or mitigate
harm to health, safety or the environment is to shift the burden of persuasion to another
party.
Presumptions and shifts in the burden of persuasion
Part of the perceived fairness of the process involves the burden of persuasion – that is,
the designation of which party has the burden of demonstrating or refuting a presumed
fact. This is distinct from the burden or standard of proof – a term referring to the
strength of the evidence (data and information) needed to justify taking action. Both
terms are relevant in formulating the precautionary principle.
Much discussion has focused on cause-and-effect relationships between exposure/
other events and harmful effects for which a high statistical confidence level or strength
of association is traditionally required. To escape the rigors of these requirements, some
proponents of the precautionary principle argue that the burden of persuasion should
be shifted to the proponents of a potentially harmful technology. Opponents argue
against so radical a shift, pointing out that negatives are harder to prove.
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Sometimes ignored by many commentators is the fact that burdens of persuasion
often shift in the course of fact-finding. Thus, depending upon the nature of the inter-
vention (notification, control, banning, treatment, compensation, etc.), even if it is
necessary for the regulator or potential victim initially to prove a (potential) harm, that
proof is sometimes not a very high burden. A presumed fact (though a rebuttable
presumption) might even be established by statute on showing certain other factual
elements, such as the very existence of harm. Then, the burden of persuasion shifts to
the intended regulated industry or alleged (potential) wrong-doer to refute the
presumed or initially established fact, often with a higher burden of proof. Legal injunc-
tions against potentially harmful action are granted by the courts as equitable remedies.
The commentators on the precautionary principle have often ignored a rich and impor-
tant set of policy interventions or actions that are informed, but not dictated, by factual
determinations. Regulatory agencies themselves – depending upon their statutory
mandates – are not bound by traditional burdens of proof. Furthermore, reviewing
courts usually give deference to factual findings by the agencies as long as they stay within
the ‘zone of reasonableness’ defined by those mandates.
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